What are you looking for?
406 hits in Complete website
Filters
Subjects
Year
Selected filters
-
Naturkraft - Naturkraft Kårstø - Investigation of ammonia leakPublished:ammonia leak An investigation of the incident on 30 May 2013 when two employees in Naturkraft’s gas-fired power station at Kårstø were exposed to ammonia solution has identified serious breaches of the regulations
- Investigation report
- Working environment
- Process safety
-
§ 7 Responsibilities pursuant to these regulationsenvironment legislation. According to Section 2-3 of the Working Environment Act and Section 25 of the Fire and Explosion Protection Act (in Norwegian only), the employees have a duty to contribute. 158-1033-F2024_1-7
- Paragraph
- The framework regulations
-
Maersk Drilling Norge AS - Mærsk Guardian - Preparedness and maintenance managementPublished:identified in connection with: Barriers and performance requirements Barriers for emergency preparedness Fire stations Training and drills Cabin doors In addition, improvement points were identified in connection
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Maintenance management
- Maersk Drilling
- Maersk Guardian
-
Statoil - Kårstø - Major accident auditPublished:addition, improvement points were identified in connection with: Improvement of technical weaknesses Fire load in the process area Documentation Flare overloading Pressure relief valves Total Risk Analysis
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Risk management
- Gassco
- Kårstø
- Kvitebjørn
-
Statoil - Statfjord C - Barrier managementPublished:in the main plan In addition, improvement points were identified in connection with: • Barriers • Fire water • Area risk charts • Non-conformity handling • Valves
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Statoil
- Statfjord C
-
Equinor – Norne – major accident risk and technical barriersPublished:identified, concerning: Planning and prioritisation Non-conformity handling Ignition source control The fire pump system Process safety Documentation No improvement points were identified. What happens next
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Risk management
- Technical safety
- Electrical installations
- Norne FPSO
- Equinor
-
A decade since Deepwater HorizonPublished:an explosion and fire. The 10th anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon disaster falls on 20 April 2020. A blowout on this drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico led to an explosion and fire. Eleven people were
- Feature
-
Vår Energi – Jotun FPSO – management of barriersPublished:of completion, system testing and handover to operations Active firefighting systems Fire integrity and passive fire protection Electrical safety and electrical facilities Ignition source control Safety
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Barrier management
- Maintenance management
- Jotun A
-
Equinor – Sleipner – barrier management and handling of risk of hydrocarbon leakagePublished:non-conformities were identified in the following areas: Barrier management Process safety Maintenance of fire doors Training and verification of performance requirements for operational and organisational barrier
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Working environment
- Equinor
- Sleipner
-
Saipem – Scarabeo 8 – emergency preparedness and helicopter operationsPublished:improvement points: Fire monitors on the helideck Marking and signage Training of the emergency response organisation on board Emergency lighting for operation of DAHR on helideck Mustering at fire stations The
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Saipem
- Scarabeo 8
-
Statoil - Kvitebjørn - Management of barriersPublished:requirements. Resultat Four non-conformities were identified in connection with: Design loads for fire Pressure control equipment Alarm load in central control room Transfer of experience In addition,
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Statoil
-
Equinor – Gudrun – non-conformity handlingPublished:factor that we have chosen to categorise as an improvement point. This concerned: Inadequate passive fire protection What happens now? We have asked Equinor to give us its assessment of the improvement point
- Inspection report
- Equinor
- Gudrun
-
Shell - Draugen - Management of technical barriersPublished:management Modification projects Result Four non-conformities were identified in connection with: Process fires Performance requirements Firewater system Warning and notification of hazard and accident situations
- Inspection report
- Technical safety
- Barrier management
- Shell
- ShellEnterprise
- Draugen
-
Equinor - Statfjord B - Investigation of short circuit incident with personal injuryPublished:in a fire. Actual and potential consequences The incident caused a production shutdown and material damage from the fire. Personnel directly involved in the incident while extinguishing the fire were exposed
- Investigation report
- Working environment
- Process safety
- Risk management
- Electrical installations
- Equinor
- Statfjord B
-
AoC audit – Odfjell Drilling AS – Deepsea Aberdeen – electrical facilities, technical safety and ICT securityPublished:Ignition source control Ventilation systems Emergency power systems Emergency lighting Fire fighting Passive fire protection Electrical facilities and installations Work in and operation of electrical
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Cyber security
- Electrical installations
- Technical safety
- Odfjell Drilling AS
- Deepsea Aberdeen
-
Equinor – Gullfaks B – holistic risk and barrier management, and robust operation and maintenancePublished:Result In the audit, we identified five non-conformities. These comprised: Barrier management Passive fire protection Escape routes from rooms for high voltage installations Risk analyses Risk reduction We
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Risk management
- Equinor
- Gullfaks B
-
Equinor – Heidrun – technical safety, process safety and electrical facilitiesPublished:we identified non-conformities within the following areas: Barriers Fixed firefighting facilities Fire doors Follow-up of non-conformities Marking of the arc flash energy level of panels In addition, we
- Inspection report
- Technical safety
- Process safety
- Electrical installations
- Equinor
- Heidrun
-
Re § 8 Structures and materialsthe NORSOK M-004 standard can be used as a basis. When selecting materials with regard to technical fire qualities as mentioned in litera d, non-flammable materials should be chosen. In those cases where
- Guideline
- Technical and operational regulations
-
Re § 34 Process safety systemssystems 34 The requirement for independence as mentioned in the first subsection, implies that the fire and gas detection system comes in addition to systems for management and control and other safety
- Guideline
- Technical and operational regulations
-
§ 7 Main safety functionsaccident situation: preventing escalation of accident situations so that personnel outside the immediate fire area are not injured, the capacity of main load-bearing structures until the facility has been evacuated
- Paragraph
- The facilities regulations