On 21 June 2023, a fire occurred in a cooling unit (DX unit) on board Gina Krog. The unit was situated in a local equipment room (LER) in the living quarters and smoke from the fire spread out from the equipment room into the corridor outside, the central control room (CCR) and the emergency preparedness room. The CCR is adjacent to the LER where the DX unit was situated, and there was no smoke-proof and gas-tight fire division between the rooms.

Relevant personnel on board were unaware that the CCR and the LER were not separated by a smoke-proof and gas-tight fire division, and that smoke and combustion gases from the fire in the LER could therefore spread into the CCR. In tackling the fire, it was necessary to evacuate the CCR and the emergency preparedness room due to smoke intrusion from the fire into both these rooms.

Actual consequences

Material damage and economic consequences included a destroyed DX unit and subsequent production stoppage/production loss.

Personnel in the CCR as well as emergency responders were exposed to smoke and fire gases, with consequent minor respiratory symptoms.

Potential consequences

There is little combustible material in the area, and it is therefore unlikely that the fire would have spread beyond the room.

Had there been personnel present in the room at the time of the fire, it is unlikely that they would have been directly exposed beyond exposure to smoke in the seconds it would take to evacuate the room.

Direct and underlying causes

The investigation team has based the conclusions in the report following the investigations of the DX unit on probable causal relationships:

The fire occurred in the section of the DX unit that contains the vast majority of the electrical components. Ignition was caused by electrical energy, most likely supplied through the 230V power supply to the fan and compressor motors.

Major damage means that the point of origin of the fire or a detailed chain of events has not been identified, but based on SINTEF’s investigations there are two possible hypotheses:

  • The cables in two of the terminals (screw clamps) of the circuit breaker through which the entire electrical power is supplied to the DX unit proved to be completely loose. Overheating here – with subsequent ignition of nearby combustible material – may have started the fire.
  • Measurements showed that series resonance produces stationary voltages of more than 400V across the motor capacitor of the fan in the external heat exchanger. This reduces the life of the capacitor, and a capacitor failure resulting in a series fault and local heating may have ignited the capacitor itself or nearby components.

Non-conformities and improvement points

Havtil's investigation has identified four regulatory non-conformities. These comprised:

  • Lack of fire division (class A)
  • Lack of knowledge about barriers
  • Deficiencies in handling of hazard and accident situations
  • Training and drilling of the emergency response organisation on board

What happens now?

The investigation has been completed. We have asked Equinor to report by 21 February 2025 on the non-conformities identified.