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Re § 35 Gas release systemthe following additions: Rapid depressurisation should be selected rather than passive fire protection. For fire loads, reference is made to Section 11, When designing gas release systems, external environment
- Guideline
- The facilities regulations
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§ 11 Loads, load effects and resistancedimensioning accidental load. When determining design loads, the effects of fire water shall not be considered. This applies to both fire loads and explosive loads. Installations, systems and equipment that are
- Paragraph
- The facilities regulations
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Statoil - Åsgard A - BarriersPublished:management Risk-reduction principles Risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis Fire divisions Non-conformity handling Fire protection Ignition source control Gas detection In addition, seven improvement
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Risk management
- Statoil
- Åsgard A
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Det norske - Ivar Aasen - Barrier managementPublished:No non-conformities were identified. Improvement points were identified in connection with: Fire duration Fire barriers Ignition source control Det norske has been given a deadline of 7 August 2015 to report
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Det Norske
- Ivar Aasen
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Prosafe - Safe Scandinavia - Technical safety, maintenance management and emergency preparednessPublished:performance standards The maintenance system Pressure safety valves (PSV) Preservation Activation of fire extinguishing systems The emergency shutdown system Risk and emergency preparedness analyses Training
- Inspection report
- Maintenance management
- Technical safety
- Emergency preparedness
- Prosafe Offshore
- Safe Scandinavia
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COSL Drilling Europe - COSLInnovator - Electrical facilities, technical safety and drilling-related systemsPublished:Overview of status of safety systems Ventilation and over-pressure in the living quarters Fire detection and fire pump start Non-conformity handling Maintenance management Performance standards In addition
- Inspection report
- Electrical installations
- Technical safety
- Well integrity
- COSL Innovator
- COSL Drilling Europe
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Aker BP - Alvheim Field - Management of risk, barriers and maintenancePublished:maintenance at Alvheim. Result Non-conformities were identified relating to: Risk reduction Fire divisions Passive fire protection Overpressure protection of stabilised oil storage tanks Identification and maintenance
- Inspection report
- Well integrity
- Process safety
- Risk management
- Aker BP
- Alvheim FPSO
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Statoil - Johan Sverdrup - Barrier managementPublished:Measures for protecting rooms and equipment from fire We found six improvement points in the following areas: Firewater system Possible weakening of fire walls Preservation of electrical facilities and
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Process safety
- Technical safety
- Statoil
- Johan Sverdrup
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Okea – Draugen – management of emergency preparednessPublished:accident situations System for follow-up of internal requirements Siting and equipping of fire stations Siting of fire cabinet on the helideck Maintenance of emergency response equipment Rescue capability
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Draugen
- OKEA
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Gassco and Equinor – Kollsnes – process safety and technical safetyPublished:requirements Inadequate documentation Deficiencies in passive fire protection Suppression of explosion pressure Measures in the event of fire pumps being out of service Maintenance We also identified an
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Kollsnes
- Equinor
- Gassco
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Transocean – Transocean Norge – emergency preparedness and technical safetyPublished:routes Maintenance Equipment in MOB boat Marking of escape routes Barrier management Passive fire protection Fire protection systems Open drainage system One factor was also observed that we have chosen to
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Technical safety
- Transocean Offshore Ltd
- Transocean Norge
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Neptune – Gjøa – integrity of structures and maritime systemsPublished:were identified in the following areas: Documentation of capacity in accident limit state Passive fire protection Assumptions for use of the facility Follow-up of suppliers In addition, an improvement
- Inspection report
- Structural safety
- Neptune Energy
- Gjøa
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Rowan Norway - Rowan Gorilla VI - Maintenance management, logistics (cranes and lifting), drilling and well technology, and emergency preparednessPublished:Preservation of equipment Pipe handling deck Loading and storage deck for helifuel Evacuation routes Fire stations and fire-fighting equipment In addition, improvement points were identified in connection with: Roles
- Inspection report
- Maintenance management
- Handling, cranes and lifting
- Well integrity
- Emergency preparedness
- Rowan
- Rowan Gorilla VI
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Equinor – Åsgard B – process safety, technical safety, maintenance management and risk managementPublished:non-conformities. These comprised: Deficient follow-up Consequences of worst credible process fire Testing and follow-up of the fire water system We also found improvement points within the following areas: Risk identification
- Inspection report
- Maintenance management
- Technical safety
- Risk management
- Process safety
- Equinor
- Åsgard B
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Aker BP – Ula – major accident risk, barriers and maintenancePublished:reduction Labelling of equipment Closing mechanism for fire doors In addition, improvement points were identified relating to: Manning Passive fire protection of fluid outlet separators Maintenance What
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Risk management
- Aker BP
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Norske Shell – Draugen – technical safety and surface protectionPublished:Result Four non-conformities were identified, relating to: Assessment of the worst credible process fire Performance requirements Testing of the firewater system Warning and notification of hazard and accident
- Inspection report
- Shell
- ShellEnterprise
- Draugen
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Equinor - Troll C - Technical safetyPublished:Troll C. Result Six non-conformities were identified, relating to: Follow-up and overview of passive fire protection Lighting in the emergency hospital and back-up emergency hospital Automatic actions in
- Inspection report
- Technical safety
- Statoil
- Troll C
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Gassco - Draupner S/E - Processing facility and the transport systemPublished:process safety. In addition, improvement points were identified in connection with: Fire protection Ruptures in the event of fire Weaknesses in the plant Control and monitoring system Nitrogen flushing of the
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Handling, cranes and lifting
- Gassco
- Draupner
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Equinor – Oseberg – barrier managementPublished:The audit identified four non-conformities. These concerned: Consequences of worst credible process fire (WCPF) Lack of independence between emergency shutdown and process safety systems for well valves
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Equinor
- Oseberg A
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Equinor – Statfjord C – barrier management – electrical facilities and technical safetyPublished:Documentation Maintenance programme for the emergency shutdown system Fire doors and passive fire protection Response time of the fire water system In addition, we observed two factors that we have chosen
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Electrical installations
- Technical safety
- Equinor
- Statfjord C