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Aker BP - Alvheim Field - Management of risk, barriers and maintenancePublished:maintenance at Alvheim. Result Non-conformities were identified relating to: Risk reduction Fire divisions Passive fire protection Overpressure protection of stabilised oil storage tanks Identification and maintenance
- Inspection report
- Well integrity
- Process safety
- Risk management
- Aker BP
- Alvheim FPSO
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Okea – Draugen – management of emergency preparednessPublished:accident situations System for follow-up of internal requirements Siting and equipping of fire stations Siting of fire cabinet on the helideck Maintenance of emergency response equipment Rescue capability
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Draugen
- OKEA
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Equinor – Oseberg Øst – major accident risk, barriers and emergency preparednessPublished:non-conformities were identified during the audit. These comprised: Lack of passive fire protection Deficiencies in fire barriers for fire water and emergency power generators Missing headset for VHF in lifeboat
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Emergency preparedness
- Process safety
- Equinor
- Oseberg Øst
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Dolphin – Borgland Dolphin – emergency preparedness and technical safetyPublished:Securing of equipment in normal operation Fire stations Training of the emergency response organisation on board Helideck Open drainage system Measures to combat fire Weaknesses in safety systems Governing
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Technical safety
- Dolphin
- Borgland Dolphin
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Altera Infrastructure Production AS – Petrojarl Knarr FPSO – electrical facilities, safety instrumented systems, process safety and technical safetyPublished:Rectification of previous non-conformities The ventilation systems Firefighting Passive fire protection Safety systems Evaluation of fire resistance Overview of status of safety systems – jumper logs Electrical facilities
- Inspection report
- Electrical installations
- Technical safety
- Vår Energi
- Petrojarl Knarr
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Equinor – Heidrun – management of emergency preparedness and helicopter operationsPublished:Equipment for dousing an engine fire was missing A fire hydrant was missing Helifuel pump cabinet sprinkler system was missing GA drawings of helideck - plan was not scaled Room for fire-resistant apparel for helideck
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Equinor
- Heidrun
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Re § 12 Materialsmaterials as regards fire-resistance characteristics as mentioned in litera d, non-flammable materials should be chosen. Where flammable materials are used, they should limit the spread of fire and produce little
- Guideline
- The facilities regulations
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Gassco and Equinor – Kollsnes – process safety and technical safetyPublished:requirements Inadequate documentation Deficiencies in passive fire protection Suppression of explosion pressure Measures in the event of fire pumps being out of service Maintenance We also identified an
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Kollsnes
- Equinor
- Gassco
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Transocean – Transocean Norge – emergency preparedness and technical safetyPublished:routes Maintenance Equipment in MOB boat Marking of escape routes Barrier management Passive fire protection Fire protection systems Open drainage system One factor was also observed that we have chosen to
- Inspection report
- Emergency preparedness
- Technical safety
- Transocean Offshore Ltd
- Transocean Norge
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Aker BP – Ula – major accident risk, barriers and maintenancePublished:reduction Labelling of equipment Closing mechanism for fire doors In addition, improvement points were identified relating to: Manning Passive fire protection of fluid outlet separators Maintenance What
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Risk management
- Aker BP
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Neptune – Gjøa – integrity of structures and maritime systemsPublished:were identified in the following areas: Documentation of capacity in accident limit state Passive fire protection Assumptions for use of the facility Follow-up of suppliers In addition, an improvement
- Inspection report
- Structural safety
- Neptune Energy
- Gjøa
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Equinor - Troll C - Technical safetyPublished:Troll C. Result Six non-conformities were identified, relating to: Follow-up and overview of passive fire protection Lighting in the emergency hospital and back-up emergency hospital Automatic actions in
- Inspection report
- Technical safety
- Statoil
- Troll C
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Norske Shell – Draugen – technical safety and surface protectionPublished:Result Four non-conformities were identified, relating to: Assessment of the worst credible process fire Performance requirements Testing of the firewater system Warning and notification of hazard and accident
- Inspection report
- Shell
- ShellEnterprise
- Draugen
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Gassco - Draupner S/E - Processing facility and the transport systemPublished:process safety. In addition, improvement points were identified in connection with: Fire protection Ruptures in the event of fire Weaknesses in the plant Control and monitoring system Nitrogen flushing of the
- Inspection report
- Process safety
- Handling, cranes and lifting
- Gassco
- Draupner
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Rowan Norway - Rowan Gorilla VI - Maintenance management, logistics (cranes and lifting), drilling and well technology, and emergency preparednessPublished:Preservation of equipment Pipe handling deck Loading and storage deck for helifuel Evacuation routes Fire stations and fire-fighting equipment In addition, improvement points were identified in connection with: Roles
- Inspection report
- Maintenance management
- Handling, cranes and lifting
- Well integrity
- Emergency preparedness
- Rowan
- Rowan Gorilla VI
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Equinor – Åsgard B – process safety, technical safety, maintenance management and risk managementPublished:non-conformities. These comprised: Deficient follow-up Consequences of worst credible process fire Testing and follow-up of the fire water system We also found improvement points within the following areas: Risk identification
- Inspection report
- Maintenance management
- Technical safety
- Risk management
- Process safety
- Equinor
- Åsgard B
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Equinor – Oseberg – barrier managementPublished:The audit identified four non-conformities. These concerned: Consequences of worst credible process fire (WCPF) Lack of independence between emergency shutdown and process safety systems for well valves
- Inspection report
- Barrier management
- Equinor
- Oseberg A
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Re § 20 Chemicals and chemical exposurecomponents. For use of chemicals, see Section 48 of these regulations. For design and placement as regards fire and explosion hazard as mentioned in the second subsection, litera c, reference is made to Section
- Guideline
- Technical and operational regulations
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Re § 7 Main safety functionssafety functions as mentioned in literas a and e, applies for the time until the areas outside of the fire area where the accident occurs have been evacuated, including the time it takes to carry out the search
- Guideline
- The facilities regulations
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Re § 43 Emergency preparedness vesselsloading and unloading of recovered oil, operation in areas where there is a risk of explosion and fire. Aircraft that are to be used in actions against acute pollution, should be designed so that they
- Guideline
- The facilities regulations