Havtil decided to investigate Equinor and Hammerfest LNG after receiving reports of numerous exposure incidents at the onshore facility between June 2024 and April 2025. Through media coverage, the supervisory authority also became aware of incidents which had not been reported and which had resulted in more serious consequences than had been indicated through the normal reporting channels.

The main objective of the investigation was to examine how Equinor had followed up the incidents and what measures the company had implemented to prevent similar incidents from reoccurring.

Unclear scope

At the time the investigation began, the scope of the exposure incidents was unclear.

- We initially believed that the scope was limited, but we soon realised that the scale of the incidents was greater in terms of their duration, the number of people affected and the number of isolated incidents of exposure, says investigation leader Morten Lunde.

The investigation shows that there have been cases of chemical exposure at Hammerfest LNG in connection with the Snøhvit Future project and other activities. At the same time, both measurements and documentation indicate that exposure levels have consistently been relatively low.

- Based on the information and documentation we gathered during the investigation, we are able to conclude that there have been instances of chemical exposure at Hammerfest LNG in connection with both the Snøhvit Future project and a number of other activities. However, based on the measurement results that we have obtained from Equinor, more specifically, measurements taken via personal monitoring devices worn in the field, we do not consider exposure levels to have been particularly high. The levels are fairly modest, says Lunde.

Accordingly, the investigation group decided to take a closer look at whether other factors might help explain why certain incidents had had such serious consequences.

Culture of fear

They found that a key part of the explanation lay in the working environment surrounding the project. Through interviews, a document review and past known whistleblowing reports, Havtil found accounts of a culture of fear, a lack of trust in management and perceptions of discrimination based on nationality.

- One of the main reasons we identified was the need to accommodate a large number of project personnel who were invited to work at Hammerfest LNG as part of the Snøhvit Future project.

- What we learned through interviews, a documentation review and what has also previously been revealed through publicly available whistleblowing reports was that there was a toxic culture within management, a culture of fear where people were afraid of being fired if they spoke up.

- One person had experiences and numerous examples of feeling that they were not being treated equally, that they were being subjected to differential treatment based on their nationality, and that the way everything was organised reinforced this feeling through a failure to provide the necessary facilities.

- The combination of an unsafe working environment, where individuals are exposed to uncertain odours and other hazards, and a sense of fear, dissatisfaction, unequal treatment, along with a feeling of not being taken looked after, can be a contributory factor behind why an exposure that initially appears to be modest in nature results in a relatively serious outcome, says Lunde.

The investigation team therefore believes that the causes must be interpreted as being the result of an interaction between a number of factors.

Havtil specifically points to the psychosocial and physical working conditions for a large number of project workers as a key factor which explains why the outcomes were serious, despite the fact that the documentation indicates low exposure levels.

Johan Castberg

As part of the work, Havtil also reviewed past cases to look for relevant parallels. Among other things, the investigation refers to an order issued to Equinor following an audit of the Johan Castberg project. The order required Equinor to adapt the project organisation to the subcontractors that were selected.

According to Lunde, Hammerfest LNG selected a subcontractor with limited experience of working on oil and gas facilities, without strengthening the project organisation as a result.

- The limited extent of the subcontractor’s experience was not taken into account, and no new resources were allocated to the project organisation as a result of the decision, he says.

- A project organisation with insufficient resources had little opportunity to monitor a new supplier, a new contractor working at the Hammerfest LNG facility, which might have helped prevent the emergence of a culture of fear and the failure to provide the proper facilities, ensure appropriate leadership and a positive work culture, and make people feel supported.

Compliance

Havtil's investigation concludes that there were four non-conformities within Equinor.

The first non-conformity relates to compliance with internal requirements and conditions specified in the PDO/PIO.

- Following the order issued to Johan Castberg, Equinor had revised its management practices and stated in its govering documents that it would allocate resources to project organisations after a contractor had been chosen. "They did not do that in the Snøhvit Future project, says Lunde.

- Furthermore, some of the feedback received following the order regarding the Johan Castberg was incorporated into the PDO/PIO, specifically regarding the provision of necessary facilities to accommodate project personnel. This also does not appear to have been adhered to in connection with the Snøhvit Future project.

Arrangements

The second non-conformity concerns inadequate arrangements as regards the physical and psychosocial working environment.

- Equinor had not made the necessary arrangements to accommodate a large number of project personnel. In addition, the project organisation for the Snøhvit Future project did not have the resources necessary to take into account and ensure a strong management culture among the projects.

- Poor leadership, a culture of fear, fear of being fired if you speak up, and fear of reprisals if you oppose something — we see these issues being reflected in both whistleblowing reports and undesirable incidents. In addition, we see that whistleblowing reports refer to discrimination and harassment based on nationality.

Overview

The third non-conformity concerns the overview of exposure sources.

- Early on in the investigation, we became aware that there had been a number of exposure incidents with various causal explanations at Hammerfest LNG and in the Snøhvit Future project, explains Lunde.

- In many cases, the cause of these incidents was unknown. It was not known where the contamination or exposure actually occurred. The source of the exposure was not known and, as a result, Equinor was unable to determine what types of contamination could be expected both at Hammerfest LNG and in connection with the Snøhvit Future project.

Decision support

The final non-conformity concerns the support for decision-making.

- We observed that decisions were being made somewhat prematurely in connection with these initial exposure incidents in June and July 2024, that the decisions made were not carefully considered and may have been based on insufficient or flawed grounds, and that they did not help prevent the recurrence of exposure incidents.

In summary, Havtil’s investigation shows that Equinor has not adequately followed through on its own commitments and promises set out in orders, or on its own obligations set out in the PDO/PIO, and that it has failed to allocate sufficient resources to its project organisation to adequately address the selection of subcontractors.

- This is presumably the first step toward this incident — the first decision that had consequences as regards how events unfolded from there. The inadequate follow-up would have contributed to the spread of this toxic culture.

- The toxic culture and culture of fear meant that, combined with the cases of chemical exposure, which were initially not particularly serious, they had a much greater impact and were perceived as being much more serious than they actually were in isolation, says Lunde.

“Serious findings”

Havtil’s Director General Sigve Knudsen stresses that the investigation has uncovered issues that the supervisory authority considers to be serious.

- We have identified non-conformities relating to management, the working environment and risk management. Among other things, the findings reveal shortcomings in the arrangements made for the employees, weaknesses in the monitoring of working environment risks, and an inadequate basis for identifying and managing risks, says Knudsen.

He points out that these are issues of great importance to health, the working environment and safety, and says that Havtil expects Equinor to follow up on the non-conformities and implement the necessary improvement measures.

Knudsen also notes that a number of the underlying causes are not unique to Hammerfest LNG and have also been identified in other areas of Equinor's operations.

- It is important that Equinor addresses these issues. 

Order

As long ago as last summer, early on in the investigation, Havtil issued Equinor with an order to ensure that further activities at the facility could be carried out in an entirely prudent manner.

- We do not intend to issue a new order at present. This does not mean that the matter is any less serious, or that our work is finished. On the contrary, we see findings that must be followed up further, both locally at Hammerfest LNG and at corporate level.

- Havtil will monitor the matter through audits and other follow-up activities, says Knudsen.

The goal is for the lessons learned from these incidents to contribute to lasting improvements, so that similar situations do not occur again.

- This is work we will be monitoring closely going forward, he stresses.