The incident on "Scarabeo 8" occurred during offline activity while rigging down of marine riser handling equipment on the main drill floor. A floorman became trapped between the riser spider and the Riser Catwalk Machine (RCWM), resulting in squeezed injuries to both thighs.

The incident

"Scarabeo 8" is a semi-submersible drilling facility which was completed in 2012 and operated by Saipem. At the time of the incident, "Scarabeo 8" was in the Barents Sea drilling two exploration wells for operator Aker BP.

After completing the exploration well 7324/8-4 and subsequently pulling and dismantling the marine riser, the plan was transferring the riser spider from the main drill floor to the pipe deck for further transport to a designated storage area.

Equipment

Riser Spider: A tool placed on the drill floor used to grip the riser, hold it in place, and support its weight during assembly and disassembly.

Riser Catwalk Machine (RCWM): A type of equipment that is used to transport pipes/risers and equipment between the pipe deck and the drill floor.

Drill Floor Manipulator Arm (DFMA): A hydraulic remotely operated tool for handling/managing larger pipe dimensions on the drill floor.

The team involved in the incident consisted of three people: two floorman (a slinger and a winch operator) and the driller.

The riser spider was located over the rotary table on the main drill floor during the incident. The RCWM was to be used to transport the marine riser spider out of the drill floor, and a transport frame was lifted and placed on the RCWM for this purpose.

Both the RCWM and DFMA can be controlled from the Cyberbase chair in the driller’s cabin.

During the activity, the transport frame slightly dislocated and rested unevenly outside the RCWM guide rails. The transport frame needed to be relocated. The crew decided to use the rig floor winch and DFMA to lift/adjust the transport frame. The transport frame was slinged with two wire slings, which was lifted using the drill floor winch. The DFMA was used to apply force to the slings, guiding the frame into position.

After placing the transport frame on the RCWM, the IP entered the area between the riser spider and the RCWM to unhook the sling from the winch hook. As a result, he entered the red zone while the driller began to adjust the position of the DFMA. The driller operated the Cyberbase panel in order to switch from RCWM mode to DFMA mode.

The driller, IP and winch operator then followed the movement of the DFMA and the winch hook. However, it turned out that the change in mode from RCWM to DFMA had not been completed and that the RCWM was still activated. Instead, adjustment via the joystick with the aim of moving the DFMA backwards resulted in the RCWM moving inward on the drill floor, towards the IP who was standing between the RCWM and the riser spider.

The winch operator noticed that the IP was about to be crushed between the RCWM and the riser spider. The winch operator immediately called over the radio to inform the driller to stop and reverse the RCWM. The driller received the message and reacted quickly. He stopped and reversed the RCWM. The IP was crushed between the RCWM and the riser spider at a contact point approximately mid-thigh.

A number of arbitrary factors and the rapid reactions of people involved limited the severity of the injury.

Havtil decided to investigate the incident on July 5, 2024.

Actual Consequences

The actual consequences of the incident were minor injuries in the form of crush injuries to both thighs and sick leave.

Potential Consequences

Our investigation revealed that the incident, under slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in severe injuries (amputation of both legs, permanent disability) or death.

Direct and Underlying Causes

The investigation identified direct and underlying causes of the incident:

  • Direct Cause:
    • The drill floor worker was squeezed between the RCWM and the riser spider.
  • Underlying Causes:
    • Failure to follow procedures for the red zone.
    • Operation of the RCWM and DFMA.
    • Material handling leading to the incident.
    • Communication failure.
    • Inadequate procedures.

Observations

The investigation identified several non-compliance with regulation, including:

  • Failure to comply with the procedure applicable when personnel are present in the red zone
  • Inadequate formulation and compliance with the procedure for rigging up/down riser handling equipment
  • Inadequate management of change
  • Design of equipment on the drill floor

Additionally, one observation was categorized as an improvement point:

Insufficient follow-up and self-verification activities.

Next Steps

We have requested Saipem to report to us by February 21, 2025, on how the non- conformities will be addressed and their assessment of the observed improvement point.