

Preface

Trends in the risk level in the petroleum activities concern all parties involved in the industry, as well as the general public. RNNP is an important tool for helping to establish a common picture of the trends in selected conditions that affect risk. RNNP is consequently of particular significance for interaction between the social partners within the petroleum activities. Their ownership of the process and the results are important both in terms of the implementation of the activity and the follow-up of results.

The petroleum industry has considerable HSE expertise, and this expertise is a critical success factor for an activity such as RNNP. We are therefore pleased to acknowledge the active contribution to this work of the industry participants, as well as key personnel from operating companies, vessel owners, helicopter operators, consultancies, research and teaching.

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0. OBJECTIVE AND LIMITATIONS

0.1 Purpose

The “Trends in risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf” project started in the year 1999. The background to the project was the participants’ need to clarify uncertainties concerning the safety consequences of the major structural changes that the petroleum industry underwent in the late 1990s.

The industry has traditionally used a selection of indicators to illustrate safety trends in the petroleum activities.

Indicators based on the frequency of lost-time incidents have been particularly widespread. It is generally accepted that this only covers a small part of the overall safety picture. Recent developments have moved towards using several indicators to measure trends. For the parties in the industry, it is important to establish methods for measuring the impact of the industry’s overall safety work.

In this report, the Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority (Havtil) wishes to set out a description of core factors that affect risk based on sets of information and data from the activities, in order to allow key aspects of the impact of the overall safety work in the activities to be measured.

0.2 Objective

The objective of the work is to:

- Measure the impact of the industry’s HSE work.
- Contribute to identifying areas that are critical for HSE and where the effort to identify causes must be prioritised in order to prevent undesirable incidents and accidents.
- Increase insight into potential causes of accidents and their relative significance for the risk profile, to provide better decision support for the industry and authorities concerning preventive safety and emergency preparedness planning.

The work may also contribute to identifying focus areas for amending regulations, as well as research and development.

0.3 Key limitations

In this report, the spotlight is on personal risk, which here includes major accidents and work accidents. Reactive and proactive indicators, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, are used.

The work is restricted to matters that are included in Havtil’s area of authority as regards safety and the working environment. All passenger transport by helicopter is also included, in cooperation with the Civil Aviation Authority Norway and the helicopter operators on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). The following areas are covered:

- All production and mobile facilities on the NCS, including subsea facilities.
- Passenger transport by helicopter between the helicopter terminals and the facilities.

- Use of vessels within the safety zone around the facilities.

Onshore installations in Havtil's administrative area are included as of 1 January 2006. Data collection started from this date, since when separate reports have been published. Outcomes and analyses for onshore installations and the results from these installations are not included in this summary report. Since 2010, an annual report has been published, with the spotlight on acute spills to sea from offshore petroleum activities. The next report on acute spills will be published in autumn 2026.

1. CONCLUSIONS

Through RNNP, we seek to measure trends in safety, the working environment and the external environment using a series of indicators. The basis for the evaluations is the triangulation principle, i.e. assessing developments by using several instruments to measure changes in factors that affect risk.

In an indicator-based model, it is to be expected that some indicators, particularly within areas with relatively few near-misses, will sometimes display large annual variations. The main focus of this report is therefore trends and developments. A positive trend in the number of near-misses may indicate that the industry's risk-management efforts are having an effect, but it provides no guarantee that future incidents will be avoided. Consequently, the petroleum industry, especially in the light of the Norwegian Parliament's ambition for the Norwegian petroleum activities to be world-leading in HSE, should maintain a constant focus on the effective management of conditions that affect risk.

Ideally, it should be possible to reach a summary conclusion on the basis of information from all the measurement instruments used. In practice, this is difficult, partly because the information used reflects HSE conditions at different levels.

Major accidents

In 2025, there were no accidents in the petroleum activities on the NCS that resulted in fatalities.

The number of near-misses with major accident potential has remained at a stable level since 2013. The level in recent years is lower than in the period preceding 2013. In 2025, there were 32 such incidents (helicopters not included). This is at the same level as in the last ten years. There were the same number of incidents as in 2024. When incidents are normalised against working hours, the frequency in 2025 is within the expected range.

Five non-ignited hydrocarbon leaks at a rate above 0.1 kg/s were recorded in 2025 (as in 2024), with all of the leaks in the category 0.1-1 kg/s. In 2025, there were 15 well control incidents, of which fourteen were in the lowest risk category, and one in the serious category. Six incidents of damage to structures and maritime systems that satisfy the damage criteria used in RNNP were registered in 2025. This is slightly fewer than in 2024 (nine incidents).

If the near-misses with major accident potential are weighted by factors identifying their inherent potential for causing fatalities were they to develop into an accident, it can be seen that the indicator (the total indicator) is lower in 2025 than in 2024. Over time, the total indicator shows an underlying positive trend. Since particularly serious incidents are assigned a relatively high risk weighting, the annual variation in the total indicator is occasionally large, but the positive trend is nevertheless clear. As described in chapter 5.3, the total indicator is a composite indicator that reflects the industry's ability to influence and manage a variety of risk-related factors. The underlying positive trend in the indicator indicates that over time the industry has improved at managing factors that affect risk. The stable levels of recent years indicate that achieving systematic improvements is more

challenging. Although an indicator based on historical figures provides relevant information on factors that affect future risk, it does not provide a comprehensive picture of future risk.

Helicopter risk constitutes a large share of the overall risk exposure to which employees on the NCS are subjected. The purpose of the risk indicators used in this work is to capture risks associated with incidents and to identify opportunities for improvement.

In the expert group's assessment of helicopter incidents for 2025, there were no incidents included in the indicator for the most serious incidents.

Barriers

Leading indicators are used to describe robustness in withstanding incidents. Barrier indicators are an example of these. Notably, this type of indicator describes the barriers' ability to function when called on. The barrier indicators continue to show that there are major differences in levels between the facilities. Over time, for many barriers, there is a positive trend that has been beyond the industry's self-defined requirements. This may be because the participants have become more aware of the importance of the quality of the barriers, and thus also the associated testing.

Maintenance data for 2025 shows that the number of hours spent on maintenance increased in both 2024 and 2025 compared to previous years. At the same time, the figures show that the total backlog in hours of preventive maintenance on fixed facilities has nearly doubled compared to 2024. The data also indicate that several facilities have not carried out HSE-critical preventive maintenance in accordance with their own schedules.

It is also apparent from the figures that the total number of hours of identified, but unperformed, corrective maintenance remains high overall. Although the trend from 2024 to 2025 is stable, the trend since 2019 has been negative.

The maintenance data for mobile facilities show large variations in the backlog in preventive and outstanding corrective maintenance. A number of facilities have not carried out HSE-critical preventive and corrective maintenance in accordance with their own schedules.

Personal injuries and accidents

In 2025, 208 reportable personal injuries were registered on the NCS, 23 of which were classified as serious. The injury rate for 2025 is 0.53 injuries per million hours worked. This represents a slight increase over 2024, but remains within the expected range based on the previous ten years.

The questionnaire-based survey

In 2025, for the thirteenth time, a comprehensive questionnaire-based survey was conducted among workers on the NCS. The survey has been conducted every other year since 2001. Even though the questionnaire is in

continuous development, the core of the survey remains the same. This makes the data unique and offers great opportunities for in-depth studies.

The questionnaire results presented in this report give an overall picture of the employees' own assessments of the HSE climate and the working environment in their workplace.

The response rate is calculated on the basis of working hours on facilities reported to Havtil in the last half of 2025. 6,349 persons completed the form, which corresponds to 25.7% of estimated working hours performed. This is higher than in 2023 (23%), but on a par with the 2021 rate (25.9%).

The results as a whole show a positive development from 2023 to 2025 in terms of both HSE climate and working environment factors. In particular, we see that the statements that have historically received the most negative ratings are also the ones that have changed the most in a positive direction. Only one statement in the survey has shown a negative trend from 2023 to 2025. 3 out of 15 health complaints have had a positive development.

The HSE climate is generally rated more positively in 2025 than in 2023. Of the 39 HSE statements in the questionnaire, 14 were rated more positively and 1 more negatively. The change is statistically significant. In terms of the physical, chemical and ergonomic working environment, 3 out of 13 questions are responded to more positively in 2025 than in 2023. For the organisational and psychosocial working environment, 6 out of 20 questions show a positive change. The results also show that those who experience bullying and/or unwanted sexual attention respond more negatively to all questions about the HSE climate and the working environment.

When it comes to health complaints, there is a positive change in 3 out of 15 of them: impaired hearing, ringing in the ears/tinnitus, respiratory problems. The six most commonly experienced health complaints are the same as in previous years: impaired hearing, ringing in the ears/tinnitus, headache, knee/hip pain, back pain, neck/shoulder/arm pain. Sleep while working offshore is viewed more negatively in 2025 than in 2023, and we see that employees on mobile facilities sleep less well when they are offshore than employees on production facilities.

2. IMPLEMENTATION

The results from RNNP are presented in annual reports. This report covers the year 2025. Work on the report was carried out mainly during the period December 2025 - March 2026.

The detailed objectives for 2025 were to:

- Continue the work carried out in previous years
- Maintain and develop the total indicator method
- Evaluate correlations in the datasets

2.1 Performance of the work

The following participants contributed to the work on this year's report:

- The Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority (Havtil): Responsible for execution and further development of the work
- Operating companies and vessel owners: Contribute data and information about activities on the facilities
- The helicopter operators: Contribute data and information about helicopter transport activities
- HSE specialist group: (selected specialists) Evaluate the procedure, input data, viewpoints on developments, evaluate trends, propose conclusions
- Safety Forum: (multipartite) Comment on the procedure and results, and recommend further work
- Advisory group: (multipartite) Multipartite RNNP advisory group that advises Havtil regarding further development of the work

Havtil's working group consists of: Tor Inge Handeland, Nils Trygve Stava, Vebjørn Dagestad, Tore Endresen, Marita Halsne, Morten Langøy, Trond Sundby, Roar Høydal, Astrid Schuchert, Jan Ketil Moberg, Eivind Jåsund, Kenneth Skogen, Bente Hallan, Torbjørn Gjerde, Øyvind Loennechen, Ulrik Junge, Roar Sognnes and Torleif Husebø.

The following external parties have assisted Havtil with specific assignments:

- Irene Buan, Torleif Veen, Marius Gårdsmann Fosse, Espen Stemland, Askild Underbakke, Martin Dugstad, Jon Andreas Rismyhr, Rie Melgaard, Ragnar Aarø, Trond Stillaug Johansen, Ine Daiwei Zhao, Marte Maria Tømterud, Torbjørn Mjåtveit, Lars Mogstad, Siri Mo, Benjamin Karlsen, Dan Øxning og Marita Pytte, all from Safetec.

- The questionnaire-based survey: Marita Pytte, Dan Øxning and Leif Inge K. Sørskår from Safetec

The following people have contributed to the work on indicators for helicopter risk:

- Kjetil Drivflaadt, Atle Brokjøb, CHC Helikopter Service
- Anders Olsen, Simen Solvik, Bristow Norway AS
- Sverre Hanssen, Per Øyvind Fuglstad, Lufttransport AS

Numerous other people have also contributed to the work.

2.2 Use of risk indicators

Data has been collected for hazard and accident situations relating to major accidents, occupational accidents and working environment factors, namely:

- Defined situations of hazard and accident, with the following main categories:
 - Uncontrolled discharges of hydrocarbons, fires (i.e. process leaks, well incidents/shallow gas, riser leaks and other fires)
 - Structure-related incidents (i.e. structural damage, collisions and risk of collision)
- Test data associated with the performance of barriers against major accidents on the facilities, including data concerning well status and maintenance management
- Accidents and incidents in helicopter transport
- Work accidents
- Other hazard and accident situations with consequences of a lesser extent or significance for emergency preparedness.

The term 'major accident' is used in many places in the reports. There are no unambiguous definitions of the term, but the following are often used, and coincide with the base definition employed in this report:

- A major accident is an accident (i.e. entails a loss) where at least three to five people may be exposed.
- A major accident is an accident caused by failure of one or more of the system's built-in safety and emergency preparedness barriers.

In light of the definition of major accident in the Seveso II Directive and in Havtil's regulations, the definition used here is closer to a 'large accident'.

Data collection for the DSHAs (Defined situations of hazard and accident) related to major accidents is founded in part on Havtil's existing databases (the Incident database (formerly CODAM), DDRS, etc.), but also to a significant degree on data collection carried out in cooperation with the operating companies and vessel owners. All incident data have been quality-assured by, for example, checking them against the incident register and other Havtil databases.

Table 2.1 lists the 21 DSHAs and the data sources used. The industry has used the same categories for registering data through databases such as Synergi.

Table 2.1 List showing the primary source of data on incidents

DSHA	Description	Database
1	Unignited hydrocarbon leak	Industry
2	Ignited hydrocarbon leak	Industry
3	Well incidents/loss of well control	Havtil
4	Fire/explosion in other areas, not hydrocarbon	Havtil/Industry
5	Ship on collision course	Industry
6	Drifting object	Industry
7	Collision with field-related vessel/facility/shuttle tanker	Havtil
8	Damage to a facility's structure, stability/anchoring/positioning failure	Havtil/Industry
9	Leak from riser, pipeline and subsea production facility*	Havtil
10	Damage to riser, pipeline and subsea production facility*	Havtil
11	Evacuation	Industry
12	Helicopter incidents	Industry
13	Man over board	Industry
14	Work accidents	Havtil
15	Work-related illness	Industry
16	Full loss of power	Industry
18	Diving accident	Havtil
19	H ₂ S emission	Industry
20	Crane and lifting operations	Havtil/Industry
21	Dropped objects	Havtil/Industry

* Also includes wellstream pipeline, loading buoy and loading hose where relevant.

2.3 Developments in the activity level

Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 show the trends over the period 2005-2025 for production and exploration activities of the parameters used for normalisation against the activity level (all figures are relative to the year 2005, which has been defined as 1.0). Appendix A to the main report (Havtil, 2026a) presents the underlying data in detail.

From 2024 to 2025, we see that the total number of working hours increased by around 8%. The number of working hours for mobile facilities rose by around 17% and for production facilities by around 5%.

Production volume fell by 2% in 2025 compared to 2024.

A presentation of DSHAs or contributors to risk can sometimes vary according to whether absolute or normalised values are stated, depending on the normalisation parameter. In the main, normalised values are presented.




Figure 2-1 Relative trend in activity level for production facilities. Normalised against the year 2005.




Figure 2-2 Relative trend in activity level for MODUs. Normalised against the year 2005

A corresponding activity overview for helicopter transport is shown in sub-chapter 4.1.

2.4 Documentation

Analyses, assessments and results are documented as follows:

- Summary report – the Norwegian Continental Shelf for the year 2025 (Norwegian and English versions)
- Main report – the Norwegian Continental Shelf for the year 2025
- Report for onshore facilities for the year 2025

- Report for acute spills to sea for the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2025, to be published in the autumn of 2026
- Methodological report, 2025

The reports can be downloaded from the Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority's website (www.havtil.no/rnnp).

3. THE SURVEY

A questionnaire-based survey was conducted of employees who were offshore in the period 13 October to 23 November 2025. The survey is carried out every other year. The year's results are reported together with data from previous years. This is the thirteenth time that data have been collected using this questionnaire. The general aim of the survey is to measure the employees' perception of HSE conditions in the Norwegian petroleum activities. Specifically, the survey has three objectives:

- To provide a description of employees' perception of HSE conditions in the offshore industry, and map factors that are significant in respect of variations in this perception.
- To help illuminate underlying factors that may go towards explaining results from other sections of RNNP.
- To follow trends over time in respect of employees' perception of HSE conditions at their own workplace.

The questionnaire consists of five main parts:

- **Demographic data.** This section includes questions about gender, age, nationality, education, job category, seniority, type of company the person is employed by, the facility, affiliation to the facility and the company, working time arrangements, emergency preparedness functions and whether the respondent has managerial responsibilities. This section also includes questions about experiences with downsizing and reorganisation.
- **HSE climate at own workplace.** This section consists of 39 statements relating to different factors of significance for the state of HSE: 1) personal assumptions for performing work safely, 2) characteristics of one's own and others' behaviour of significance for HSE, and 3) conditions in the work situation that affect one's own behaviour.
- **Assessment of accident risk.** This section consists of a question where the participants are asked to answer how often they are afraid of 14 different accident scenarios. The scenarios cover most of the defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHAs) included in RNNP.
- **Working environment.** This section consists of 33 questions covering physical working environment factors (exposure and strain), psychosocial and organisational working environment factors (requirements for concentration and attentiveness, control over one's own work performance and social support) and job security. Four questions deal with bullying and unwanted sexual attention. There are also 11 questions about working hours, rest and recovery. One question about accommodation and living conditions offshore is also included in this section.
- **Health complaints, sickness absence and injuries.** This section consists of five questions concerning sickness absence and involvement in any work accidents causing injuries, as well as 15 questions about health complaints experienced.

A similar survey is also carried out of onshore facilities. Most of the questions are the same, but there are also certain differences. Finally, this chapter presents a comparison of the results for the offshore and onshore facility samples respectively in 2025.

The questionnaire survey for 2025 made the following changes to the questionnaire:

- In the online version of the question about offshore rotations, the response option “yes, other fixed rotation” included a free-text field where respondents could specify the type of rotation they have.
- The questions regarding digital tools were rolled out in 2025.
- The question of whether respondents are well-trained to perform emergency response tasks in crisis situations was posed to those who answered “yes” to the question of whether they have an emergency response role.
- The statement “I have to share a cabin with others when I sleep” was changed to “I must share my cabin with a person on the opposite shift”.

In addition to these changes, a few linguistic adjustments have been made.

3.1 Introduction

For a questionnaire-based survey where everyone in a specific area is given the opportunity to respond, the composition of the respondents is important for the representativity of the responses. Based on the information available, we can say that the respondents to this survey do essentially reflect the demographic composition of the employees in this industry. In some cases, Safetec has collected normalisation data, which makes it possible to assess whether certain groups are over- or underrepresented compared to the expected proportion of respondents in those groups. Although a high response rate is desirable, it is of less significance for the assessment of the survey’s validity. At the same time, the composition of the respondents has essentially remained stable from year to year, and this provides a good basis for comparison over time. Some differences between the groups are noted below.

The overall response rate (mobile and production facilities) was 25.7% in 2025, which is higher than in 2023 (23%) and similar to 2021 (25.9%). We observe that the average age of the sample has increased over the survey periods. The 51–60 age group is the largest group, as in the previous three surveys. The proportion of respondents under the age of 24 has remained consistently low from 2011 to 2025, while the proportion of responses from the 25- to 50-year-old age groups has shown a downward trend over the years. For example, the proportion of people aged 41–50 has fallen from 30% in 2011 to 18.6% in 2025. The number of people aged 51 and older has been on the rise over time, particularly since 2015.

The following provides a summary of the most important results within the various topics in the questionnaire. For further details, please see the main report. The indication (sig.) with optional asterisk(s) means that the changes between 2023 and 2025 or differences between groups are statistically significant (* for $p \leq .01$ and ** for $p \leq .001$).

This is shown as "(sig**)" and "(sig*)" in the text. Where several statements are concerned, "(sig.)" is used since there are different levels for the different questions.

3.2 HSE climate

The HSE climate is generally rated more positively in 2025 than in 2023. Of the 39 HSE statements in the questionnaire, 6 have more positive assessments (sig.), and 1 has more negative assessments (sig.). The following HSE statements have the largest changes from 2023 to 2025 (all these changes are positive, except for the statement "Risk-filled operations are always..." (no. 1) which was assessed more negatively):

- Risk-filled operations are always carefully planned before they are started
- Dangerous situations arise because everyone does not speak the same language
- Increased cooperation between facility and land through the use of IT systems has led to less secure operations
- Different facilities have different procedures and routines for the same circumstances, and this constitutes a threat to safety
- I experience a pressure not to report personal injuries or other incidents which may "mess up the statistics"
- I feel peer pressure which affects HSE assessments
- The emergency preparedness is good

The positive trends in certain areas of the HSE climate are primarily attributed to respondents on mobile facilities. These areas also appear to have been rated most negatively over time, but in 2025 they have shifted in a somewhat more positive direction. On mobile facilities, 13 of the statements have shown an improvement, compared with three such statements for production facilities.

In 2025, there were two statements that had moved in a negative direction for two consecutive years (sig.). One concerned whether the frequent occurrence of parallel work operations leads to hazardous situations, while the other focused on whether inadequate maintenance has resulted in poorer safety. There was a positive trend regarding maintenance (sig**), and we are seeing the same improvement on both mobile facilities and production facilities. The question concerning parallel operations, however, remains unchanged.

Of the six indices, only *Cooperation and communication* showed more positive scores (sig**) compared to 2023. Several of the HSE indices showed a negative trend in 2021, but in 2023 returned to levels similar to those of 2019. In 2025, we see a more stable trend, with the vast majority of indices remaining stable. Compared to 2021, six of the HSE indices have shown an upward trend in 2025 (sig**).

3.3 Perceived risk

14 questions in the survey are directed at how often the respondent is "afraid of" different incidents, where the scale goes from "several times every week" to "rarely or never".

In the last three surveys (2019, 2023, and 2025), the situations respondents feared most were dropped objects and serious work accidents. In 2025, 43.8% are afraid (several times per half-year or more often) of dropped objects, and 30.1% are afraid of serious work accidents.

Compared to 2023, the assessments of ten of the risk situations in 2025 have improved (sig.). Only one has changed for the worse: helicopter accident (sig**).

3.4 Working environment

In terms of the physical, chemical and ergonomic working environment, there is little change from 2023 to 2025. Of 13 questions, three have more positive answers in 2025 than in 2023, and none were answered more negatively (sig.). The three questions with positive changes are:

- Are you exposed to noise levels so high that you have to stand close to people and shout to be heard, or have to use headsets?
- Do you work in cold areas exposed to the weather?
- Do you work under poor indoor conditions?

If we examine mobile facilities and production facilities separately, we see that four questions concerning the physical, chemical, and ergonomic working environment are improving on mobile facilities (sig.). On production facilities, however, none of these questions are assessed more positively in 2025 than in 2023. On the contrary, there is one question that is assessed more negatively; a larger proportion of respondents report working while squatting or kneeling (sig*).

6 out of 20 questions about the psychosocial working environment were assessed more positively in 2025 than in 2023 (sig.). No question was assessed more negatively. The questions that have changed in a positive direction are:

- Does your immediate supervisor value your work results?
- Can you influence decisions which are important to your work?
- Does your immediate supervisor help and support you in your work, if you need it?
- Does your immediate supervisor give you feedback on your work performance?
- Is your workplace well adapted to the work tasks you perform?
- Do the digital solutions you use provide the necessary support in the performance of your work tasks?

Among respondents on mobile facilities, we see that 12 out of 20 questions are rated more positively in 2025 than in 2023 (sig.), while no questions show significantly different assessments on production facilities. In 2023, however, the opposite was true, with most changes occurring on production facilities (and also in a positive direction).

Overall, 4.5% experience bullying (from occasionally, to several times per week) and 2.2% experience unwanted sexual attention either occasionally or more frequently. There is relatively little overlap between these groups (0.9%). Compared to 2023, no significant changes have been recorded in either the proportion who experience bullying or the proportion who experience sexual harassment. However, a higher percentage of women (13.5%) than men (0.9%) have experienced unwanted sexual attention (sig**). Compared to 2023 (11.2%), a higher percentage of people in 2025 (20.8%) have experienced unwanted sexual attention from managers (sig*).

3.5 Sleep, health, sickness absence and injury

Most questions about sleep are rated the same in 2025 as in 2023, but there is a negative trend regarding the statement "I sleep well when I'm offshore" (sig*). Employees on mobile facilities, in particular, respond more negatively to this. However, employees on mobile facilities have not changed their assessment from 2023 to 2025, while employees on production facilities are responding more negatively than they did. As in previous years, there is a difference between how employees with different shift schemes rate the quality of their sleep. In general, those who work day shifts assess sleep the most positively, and those who work swing shifts assess it the most negatively.

For three of the 15 health complaints employees were asked about, a smaller proportion reported having them in 2025 compared to 2023: ringing in the ears/tinnitus, skin conditions and respiratory problems. As in previous surveys, the complaints most respondents experience are pain in the neck/shoulder/arm, back pain and knee/hip pain. If we look at the results from 2017 and 2021, we see an upward trend in the proportion of respondents who attribute their health complaints to their work.

Fewer employees in 2025 responded that they had had sickness absence due to their own illness (26.9%) compared with 2023 (32.7%). 20.8% of those who have had sickness absence believe that the last such absence was wholly or partly caused by their work situation (compared to 23.2% in 2023). The same proportion as in 2023 had been in an accident involving personal injury in 2025 (3.5%). The percentage has remained relatively stable over the last four surveys.

3.6 Overtime

In 2025, approximately half (44.8%) reported working more than 5 hours of overtime on their last offshore trip, compared with 47.3% in 2023. The proportion of respondents who report working overtime appears to have remained stable across recent surveys, and no significant decline was observed in 2025. The results, however, remain consistently high. The results also showed that there is a correlation between working so much overtime that it becomes a burden and getting sufficient rest between workdays. Respondents who reported that they frequently work so much overtime that it becomes a burden generally reported that they got sufficient rest between workdays less often.

3.7 Comparison between results offshore and onshore

For both samples, there is a tendency towards increasing age and seniority. The largest proportion of respondents both offshore and onshore are aged 51-60 years. There is still a higher proportion of younger people working onshore than offshore. There are more men than women in both samples, but the disparity is greater offshore (89.8% men) than onshore (79.3% men). The proportion of men has remained relatively stable in all surveys since 2015, both offshore and onshore. At onshore facilities, we now see that 39.4% of respondents report having managerial responsibilities, while offshore the figure is 37.7%. Concerning terms of employment, permanent employment is somewhat more prevalent among respondents offshore (96.1%) than at onshore facilities (93.7%).

Offshore, 67.7% of respondents are employed by contractors, compared with 42.4% at onshore facilities. Based on working hours, the contractors are somewhat underrepresented offshore.

Figure 3-1 shows an overview of the questions about HSE, the physical and psychosocial working environments, and health complaints, and how many of the responses have changed (sig.) compared to 2023, at offshore and onshore facilities.




Figure 3-1 Overview of the number of positive (green), negative (red) or unchanged (yellow) responses in 2025 compared to 2023, offshore and onshore.

Overall, we see a predominantly positive trend offshore, but the majority of responses are unchanged. When it comes to the physical working environment, there is one more response that has moved in a positive direction onshore than offshore. In terms of the HSE climate, however, the changes at the onshore facilities have been minor.

The results suggest few changes onshore, but at the same time we see significant variations between the different onshore facilities. Similarly, offshore, we see differences in the responses of mobile facilities and production facilities. In 2025, mobile facilities account for the largest changes in the results from 2023 to 2025, and the proportion of respondents working on mobile facilities also increased in 2025.

When asked about various health complaints, three have improved offshore, while three have worsened onshore. We examine the various areas in a little more detail below.

HSE climate

For the offshore sample, the results concerning HSE climate are relatively stable, with only the *Cooperation and communication* index showing a positive trend (sig**). We do not see the same positive trend onshore, where the *Cooperation and communication* index shows similar results in 2023 and 2025.

When examining individual statements, we find that there is a significant positive trend offshore in 13 of 39 statements, and three that are trending positively onshore (sig.). One statement offshore shows a significant negative trend, and as does one statement onshore (sig.). Offshore, the question is whether risk-filled operations are always carefully planned before they are started, while onshore, the question is whether dangerous situations have arisen because people have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol at work.

Physical, chemical and ergonomic working environment

The results regarding the physical, chemical, and ergonomic working environment are generally stable, but three of the 13 questions show a positive change (sig.). For employees at onshore facilities, four questions show a positive change (sig.). Two of these questions are the same for both offshore and onshore operations and concern whether employees are exposed to high noise levels and whether they work in cold, weather-exposed areas.

We see clear differences in how offshore and onshore employees view various physical workplace issues. The figure below shows the questions with the largest difference in the proportion of respondents who selected the two most negative response categories. We see that a higher proportion of offshore workers are exposed to high noise levels and various physically demanding tasks, such as working with their hands at or above shoulder height. They are also the most likely to come into skin contact with oil, drilling mud, and detergents. Employees at onshore facilities are more likely to report that they have sedentary jobs with little possibility of variation (sig**).




Figure 3-2 Percentage of respondents who answered “rather often” or “very often or always” to questions with the greatest difference between offshore and onshore.

Psychosocial and organisational working environment

With regard to the psychosocial and organisational working environment, six questions have changed positively offshore, and one question has done so at onshore facilities (sig.). Offshore, these cover a variety of topics, ranging from support and feedback from immediate supervisors to workplace accommodations. The issue that has seen a positive trend at onshore facilities is whether it is necessary to work at a fast pace, with a smaller proportion now saying that this is necessary.

The proportion who state that they have been the victim of bullying is approximately the same both offshore (4.5%) and onshore (4%), and it is bullying from colleagues that is most prevalent. A somewhat lower proportion offshore (2.2%) answer that they have been exposed to unwanted sexual attention than is the case onshore (4.6%). For women, the proportions are 13.5% (offshore) and 15.1% (onshore).

Accommodation and sleep

There are differences in how accommodation and sleep are rated offshore and onshore, but the conditions are also different. Everyone working offshore must be accommodated on the facility, while only a minority of onshore employees are accommodated by the employer. The offshore employees are more satisfied with accommodation and living conditions than those accommodated onshore (sig*). Of those who say they are accommodated by their employer onshore, 73.8% say they always, very often or rather often sleep well when they are so

accommodated. For offshore workers, perceptions of sleep quality are more negative in 2025 than in 2023 (sig*), while this remains unchanged onshore.

Health

There has been a decline in reported health complaints offshore. Offshore, a smaller proportion reported suffering from three out of 15 health conditions compared to 2023: hearing loss, ringing in the ears/tinnitus, and respiratory problems (sig.). At the same time, there has been an upward trend in the proportion of respondents who attribute their health complaints to their work. At onshore facilities, there has been an increase in the proportion of people with three health conditions: gastrointestinal problems, respiratory problems, and cardiovascular diseases (sig.). For both samples, hearing problems (impaired hearing and ringing in the ears/tinnitus) and musculoskeletal disorders (pain in the neck/shoulders/arm, back pain and knee/hip pain) are most prevalent. Of all the health complaints, a larger proportion of respondents offshore than onshore state that they are wholly or partly work-related. Offshore, ringing in the ears/tinnitus is the most common complaint stated to be work-related, and onshore the most prevalent complaint attributed to work is pain in the neck/shoulders/arms.

A smaller proportion of respondents report having taken sick leave offshore (26.9%) than onshore (53.3%), and this represents a decrease in the rate of sickness absence offshore compared to 2023 (sig**). The difference between offshore and onshore may be due to differences in work and rotation schedules. A slightly lower percentage of respondents also report having been involved in an accident resulting in personal injury offshore (3.5%) than onshore (4.5%).

4. STATUS AND TRENDS – HELICOPTER INCIDENTS

Cooperation with the Civil Aviation Authority Norway and the helicopter operators on the work on risk indicators was continued in 2025. Aviation data obtained from the helicopter operators involved includes incident type, risk class, severity, type of flight, phase, helicopter type and information about departure and arrival.

4.1 Activity indicators

Figure 4-1 shows activity indicator 1 which covers the number of flight hours and the number of passenger flight hours per year in the period 2005-2025. The sharp reduction in the number of flight hours and passenger flight hours from 2014-2016 is due to the reduction in the number of hours worked on the NCS.



Figure 4-1 Flight hours and passenger flight hours per year, 2005-2025

4.2 Incident indicators

4.2.1 INCIDENT INDICATOR 1 – SERIOUS INCIDENTS AND NEAR-MISSES

Figure 4-2 shows the number of incidents included in incident indicator 1. From 2009 (and subsequently for 2006, 2007 and 2008), the most serious near-misses which the companies reported were reviewed by an expert group consisting of operational and technical personnel from the helicopter operators, from the oil companies and from Havtil's project group in order to classify the incidents based on the following categories:

- Little remaining safety margin against fatal accident: *No remaining barriers*
- Medium remaining safety margin against fatal accident: *One remaining barrier*
- Large remaining safety margin against fatal accident: *Two (or more) remaining barriers.*




Figure 4-2 Incident indicator 1 per year by causal categories, not normalised, 2006–2025

In the expert group's assessment of incidents for 2025, there were no incidents included in incident indicator 1.

A helicopter accident occurred off the coast of the island of Sotra on 28 February 2024, in which one person died. The incident took place during a training exercise involving the rescue helicopter. Practice flying is not one of the indicators used in RNNP, as the risk profile for such activities is different than for ordinary flying, including SAR.


5. STATUS AND TRENDS – INDICATORS FOR MAJOR ACCIDENTS ON FACILITIES

The indicators for major accident risk from previous years have been continued, with a primary emphasis on indicators for incidents and near-misses with the potential for causing a major accident (DSHA 1-10). The indicators for DSHA 12, helicopter incidents, are presented separately in chapter 4. Barriers against major accidents are presented in chapter 6.

There have been no major accidents, per the definition used in the report, on facilities on the NCS since 1990. The serious incident on COSL Innovator in 2015 where a wave stove in windows in an accommodation section, injuring four and killing one person, is categorised as a structural incident and is the first major accident DSHA to have caused a fatality in the period 2005-2025. The last time there were any fatalities in connection with one of these major accident DSHAs was in 1985, with a shallow gas blowout on the "West Vanguard" mobile facility. Added to this are the helicopter accidents which occurred at Norne and Turøy in 1997 and 2016.

5.1 DSHAs associated with major accident risk

Figure 5-1 shows the trend in the number of reported DSHAs during the period 2005-2025. It is important to emphasise that this figure does not take account of the near-misses' potential in respect of loss of life. There was a rising trend in the number of incidents during the period 1996-2000, which has been discussed in previous years' reports. From the level in 2005, there was a gradual reduction in the number of incidents with major accident potential. The level has been stable since 2013. In 2025, there were as many incidents as in the previous year.



*Within the safety zone

Figure 5-1 Reported DSHAs (1-10) by categories. (*Within the safety zone)

Figure 5-1 shows the numbers, while Figure 5-2 is the same overview normalised against the number of working hours. The level for 2025 is within the expected range, indicating a stable level compared to the average in the previous ten-year period.




Figure 5-2 Total number of DSHA 1-10 incidents normalised against working hours.

5.2 Risk indicators for major accidents

5.2.1 DSHA 1 - HYDROCARBON LEAKS IN THE PROCESS AREA

Figure 5-3 shows an overview of hydrocarbon leaks above 0.1 kg/s for the period 2005-2025, broken down by category of leak rate. Five hydrocarbon leaks with a rate above 0.1 kg/s were recorded in 2025, the same as in 2024, all of which were in the 0.1-1 kg/s category.




Figure 5-3 Number of hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, 2005-2025

Figure 5-4 shows the number of leaks when these are weighted according to their assessed risk potential. In simple terms, one can say that the risk contribution of each leak is roughly proportional to the leak rate expressed in kg/s. The risk contribution in 2025 is slightly higher than in 2024, but the incidents were in the lowest category.




Figure 5-4 Number of hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, 2005-2025, weighted according to risk potential

Figure 5-5 shows the trend in leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, normalised against working hours for production facilities. The figure shows that the number of leaks per million working hours in 2025 lies within the prediction range. The change is therefore not statistically significant relative to the mean for the period 2015-2024. The number of leaks has been normalised both against working hours and the number of facility years in the main report.




Figure 5-5 Trend, leaks, normalised against working hours

5.2.2 DSHA 3 - LOSS OF WELL CONTROL, BLOWOUT POTENTIAL, WELL INTEGRITY

There were 15 well control incidents in 2025, seven in production drilling and eight in exploration drilling. All but one well control incidents fell into the lowest category, so-called regular incidents in the “green” category. The last is classified as a red incident.

Figure 5-6 shows well control incidents broken down by exploration drilling and production drilling, normalised per 100 drilled wells. In general, the number of well control incidents per drilled well has been higher for exploration drilling, and with greater annual variation, than for production drilling. This is also the case in 2025. As regards production drilling, it is apparent that the incident frequency in 2025 is lower than in 2024, but on a par with what it has been during the past two years.




Figure 5-6 Well incidents per 100 wells drilled, for exploration and production drilling

Figure 5-7 shows the trend in weighted risk potential of loss of life normalised against working hours for exploration and production drilling combined. The figure shows that in 2017-2025 there was a relatively low risk associated with well control incidents on the NCS. Nevertheless, there is an increase in risk in 2025 due to a red Level 1 well control incident. In assessing the severity of this incident, consideration has been given to the fact that the volume of the spill was limited and that the incident occurred on a mobile facility. The peaks we see in the figure are often associated with serious individual incidents that are weighted very highly compared to other incidents.




Figure 5-7 Risk indicators for well-control incidents in exploration and production drilling, 2005-2025

5.2.3 DSHA 5, 6, 7 AND 8 - SHIP ON COLLISION COURSE, STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

The number of instances of ships on collision courses has declined substantially in recent years. The number of incidents in 2025 (3 reported incidents) shows no statistically significant change against the average in the period 2015-2024.

Major accidents associated with structures and maritime systems are rare. Even though there have been several very serious incidents in Norway, there are too few to gauge trends. Accordingly, incidents and damage of lesser severity have been selected as measures of changes in risk. It is assumed that there is a connection between the number of minor incidents and the most serious; see the methodology report.

The current regulations set requirements for flotel and production facilities in terms of withstanding the loss of two anchor lines without serious consequences. Loss of more than one anchor line happens from time to time. Mobile drilling facilities are required to withstand the loss of one anchor line without undesirable consequences.

There were three incidents in 2025 involving collisions between field-related vessels and installations.

Structural damage and incidents that have been included in RNNP are primarily classified as fatigue damage, while some are storm damage. As regards cracks, only continuous structural cracks are included. No clear connection has been demonstrated between the age of the facility and the number of cracks. Figure 5-8 shows the number of reported incidents and damage events to structures and maritime systems which conform to the criteria for DSHA 8 in the period 2005-2025. In total, six incidents are included for 2025. That is three fewer than in 2024.




Figure 5-8 Number of reported incidents and damage events to structures and maritime systems which conform to the criteria for DSHA 8

5.2.4 DSHA 9 AND DSHA 10 - LEAK/DAMAGE TO RISERS, PIPELINES AND SUBSEA FACILITIES

In 2025, no serious leaks from risers were reported. Nor were any serious leaks from pipelines within the safety zones in 2025. Two incidents of hydrocarbon leaks from pipelines and subsea facilities outside the safety zones of manned facilities were reported.

As in previous years, there are still some leaks of chemicals such as hydraulic/barrier/control fluid and the like. Nine such leaks have been reported.




Figure 5-9 Number of leaks from risers & pipelines within the safety zone, 2005-2025

Serious damage is included in the calculation of the total indicator, but with a lower weighting than for leaks. In 2025, no serious damage to risers, pipelines, or subsea installations was reported. Figure 5-10 shows the number of incidents of major damage to risers and pipelines during the period 2005-2025. Updated information has emerged from a number of previous years, which means that the figure is not comparable with figures in previous reports.




Figure 5-10 Number of major damage incidents to risers & pipelines within the safety zone, 2005-2025

5.3 Total indicator for major accidents

The total indicator is a calculated indicator based on incident frequency and the potential of the incidents/near-misses to cause loss of life if they develop into an actual accident. It is emphasised that this indicator is only a supplement to the individual indicators, and expresses the development in risk factors related to major accidents. In other words, the indicator expresses the effects of risk management.

The total indicator weights the contributions from the observations of the individual near-misses according to the potential for loss of life, and will therefore vary considerably, based on the potential of the individual incidents. The weightings were last amended in 2020 to better reflect current knowledge. More details about these can be found in the methodology report (Havtil, 2026c). The weightings are still fixed for different types of incidents and facility types. Especially serious incidents are assessed individually, in order to determine a realistic weighting based on the relevant conditions at the facility and the incident. In 2025, there was one such incident. During a cutting operation, water mixed with gas gushed uncontrollably up through the rotary table on the drill floor and into the shaker room. The flow caused the gas to spread rapidly to several areas of the facility.

There are large annual variations in this indicator, mainly caused by especially serious incidents. The large variations are reduced when viewing the three-year rolling average. This clarifies the underlying trend. Normalisation is performed against working hours. The level of the normalised value is set at 100 for the year 2005, which also applies to the value for the three-year rolling average.

Over time, the number of near-misses has been reduced from a peak of 120 incidents in 2002, to between 30 and 40 incidents in recent years. Such a positive development in itself means that an overall, and weighted, indicator such as the total indicator will become more sensitive to annual fluctuations in the number of incidents. Accordingly, the focus now should be increasingly less on annual values, with a greater emphasis on trends over time instead.

Figure 5-11 shows the total indicator for production and mobile facilities. Although there is a small reduction from 2024 to 2025, the underlying trend, illustrated using a three-year rolling average, shows a positive trend over time, with a levelling off in recent years.




Figure 5-11 Total indicator for major accidents per year, normalised against working hours (Reference value is 100 in the year 2005, both for total indicator and three-year rolling)

The trend can be interpreted to mean that, in this period, the participants have achieved better management of factors that affect major accident risk. This can also be taken as an indication that factors that affect future risk must be kept in sharp focus and under active and continuous management.

Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-13 show the total indicator for production facilities and mobile facilities respectively.




Figure 5-12 Total indicator, major accidents, production facilities, normalised against working hours, compared to three-year rolling average (Reference value is 100 in the year 2005, both for total indicator and three-year rolling)




Figure 5-13 Total indicator, major accidents, mobile facilities, normalised against working hours, compared to three-year rolling average (Reference value is 100 in the year 2005, both for total indicator and three-year rolling)

6. STATUS AND TRENDS – BARRIERS AGAINST MAJOR ACCIDENTS

Reporting and analysis of data concerning barriers has been continued from preceding years without significant adjustments. As previously, the companies report test data from routine periodic testing of selected barrier elements.

6.1 Barriers in the production and processing facilities

Primary emphasis is placed on barriers relating to leaks from the production and processing facilities, including the following barrier functions:

- Integrity of hydrocarbon production and processing facilities (covered to a considerable degree by the DSHAs)
- Prevent ignition
- Reduce clouds/emissions
- Prevent escalation
- Prevent any fatalities

The different barriers consist of several interacting barrier elements. For example, a leak must be detected before isolation of ignition sources and emergency shutdown (ESD) is implemented.

Figure 6-1 shows the proportions of failures for selected barrier elements associated with production and processing. The test data are based on reports from all production operators on the NCS. In addition, the associated industry norm for each barrier element is shown. Mean proportions of failures for 2025 are outside the industry norms for blowdown valves (BDV), deluge valves and riser ESDV closure tests and leak tests.




Figure 6-1 Mean percentage of failure for selected barrier elements in 2025

The main report shows both the “mean proportion of failures”, i.e. the proportion of failures for each facility individually, averaged for all facilities, and the “overall proportion of failures”, i.e. the sum of all failures on all reporting facilities, divided by the sum of all tests for all reporting facilities. All facilities make the same contribution to the mean proportion of failures, regardless of how many tests they have.

The data show considerable variations in average levels for each of the operating companies, and for several of the barrier elements. The variations are even greater when one looks at each individual facility, as has been done for all barrier elements in the main report.

Figure 6-2 shows an example of such a comparison for fire detection. Each individual facility is assigned a letter code, and the figure shows the proportion of failures in 2025, the mean proportion of failures during the period 2005-2025, as well as the total number of tests carried out in 2025 (as text on the X axis, along with the facility code). The industry norm for fire detection is 0.01. The figure shows that three facilities lay outside the norm for the proportion of failures in 2025, while one lay outside the norm when considering the mean over the period 2005-2025.




Figure 6-2 Average failures for fire detection

For production facilities, barrier data have now been collected for 21 years for most of the barriers, and the results show that there are large differences in level between the facilities. In Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4 the mean proportion of failures as three-year rolling averages are compared from 2011 to 2025.

Figure 6-3 shows that fire detection, gas detection and start tests of fire pumps are consistently low and within the respective industry norms for mean proportions of failures expressed as three-year rolling averages.

Riser ESDV closure tests show a fall from the start of the period up to 2015, but a rising trend from 2015-2021.

Since 2021, closure tests have shown a declining trend, with the lowest level of this period being in 2024.

However, it rose again in 2025. Riser ESDV leak tests have the same trend, with declines up to 2018 and then a sharp increase every year until 2021 before falling off again in 2022-2024. Like the closure test, the leak test also rose in 2025. All years lie well outside the industry norm of 0.01 for riser ESDV closure tests, and for leak tests most years are similarly outside the norm.

BDV shows a downward trend from 2012 to 2015, with a subsequent slight upward trend in the period 2015-2022.

There has been a downward trend from 2022 to 2025. In 2025, the value is the lowest for the period, at 0.012, but this is still above the industry norm of 0.01. Deluge valve fluctuates around the industry norm at 0.01 for the whole period, with some years outside and other years within the norm. In 2025, the deluge valve value increased to 0.014, placing it outside the industry norm.




Figure 6-3 Mean percentage of failures as a three-year rolling average (part 1 of 2)

Figure 6-4 shows that, for DHSV, the mean proportion of failures expressed as a three-year rolling average has a rising trend from 2012 to 2017, before flattening out and showing a steady slight decline during the period 2021-2025. DHSV has been outside the industry norm of 0.02 since 2013. Other barriers in Figure 6-4 remain within the applicable industry norm.

The wing and master valve closure and leak tests have shown a weak downward trend in recent years. In 2025, both were at roughly the same level as in the preceding three years. PSV was relatively stable in the period 2011-2019, with a rising trend in subsequent years. In 2025, PSV fell back again slightly. PSV is still well within the industry norm of 0.04 throughout the period 2011-2025.




Figure 6-4 Mean percentage of failures as a three-year rolling average (part 2 of 2)

Table 6-1 shows the number of facilities that have carried out tests for each barrier element, the average number of tests for those facilities that have carried out tests, the number of facilities with a proportion of failures outside the industry norm in 2025, and the average for the period 2005-2025 outside the industry norm. The mean proportion of failures for 2025 and for the period 2005-2025 have also been included. These can then be compared with the industry's availability requirements for safety-critical systems. Figures in bold indicate that the proportion of failures lies outside the industry norm.

For closure and leak tests of riser ESDVs, as well as wing and main valves, the average values are based on data from 2007. For PSV and BDV, the average has been calculated since 2005. With regard to BOP, for which there is no established industry norm, the table shows the number of facilities that have reported one or more failures.

Table 6-1 General calculations and comparison with the industry norms for barrier elements

Barrier elements	Facilities conducting tests in 2025	Average no of tests for facilities testing in 2025	Facilities with failures above industry norm in 2025 (average 2005-2025 in brackets) ^{1,2}	Mean percentage failures in 2025	Mean percentage failures 2005-2025	Industry norm for availability
Fire detection	73	452	3 (2)	0.002	0.003	0.010
Gas detection	73	238	10 (10)	0.005	0.006	0.010
Shut down:						
· Riser ESDV	70	19	9 (33)	0.016	0.019	0.010
Closure test	70	12	6 (30)	0.013	0.020	0.010
Leak test	68	7	3 (23)	0.016	0.015	0.010
· Wing and master valve	84	215	7 (4)	0.007	0.009	0.020
Closure test	83	100	4 (1)	0.003	0.006	0.020
Leak test	84	117	14 (9)	0.009	0.010	0.020
· DHSV	85	86	26 (39)	0.019	0.025	0.020
BDV	65	50	20 (43)	0.014	0.020	0.010
PSV	71	71	14 (10)	0.025	0.023	0.040
Isolation with BOP	20	146	-	0.006	0.010	-
Active fire protection:						
· Deluge valve	73	27	12 (24)	0.012	0.011	0.010
· Start up test	61	83	8 (15)	0.003	0.003	0.005

6.2 Barriers associated with maritime systems

In 2025, data were collected for the following maritime barriers on mobile facilities:

- Watertight doors

¹ For *closure tests* and *leak tests* for riser ESDVs and wing and master valves, the average is from 2007, for PSVs and BDVs, the average is from 2005.

² For BOP, which does not have a defined industry norm, the table shows the number of facilities with number of failures above 0.

- Valves in the ballast system

For 2025, no failures were recorded for the closure of watertight doors, and the proportion of failures was therefore zero. The proportion of failures in 2024 was also zero. The proportion of failures of valves in the ballast system in 2025 is on par with the industry standard availability requirement of 0.02.

6.3 Maintenance management

Defective or deficient maintenance has often proved to be a contributory cause of accidents, including major accidents. The major accident potential means that safety work in general and the maintenance of safety-critical equipment in particular have been given a strong emphasis in the petroleum industry.

One aim of maintenance management is to identify critical functions and ensure that safety-critical barriers work when required.

The individual participant is responsible for regulatory compliance and ensuring systematic HSE efforts, so as to reduce the risk of unwanted incidents and major accidents.

Maintenance data for 2025 show that the number of maintenance hours performed on fixed facilities – including project work, modifications and turnaround work – has risen steadily since 2020. At the same time, the figures show that the total number of hours of identified, but unperformed, corrective maintenance remains high overall. Although the trend from 2024 to 2025 is stable, the trend since 2019 has been negative.

The figures also show that the total backlog in hours of preventive maintenance on fixed facilities has nearly doubled compared to 2024. The data also indicate that several facilities have not carried out HSE-critical preventive maintenance in accordance with their own schedules.

Corrective maintenance (Total CM) is divided this year into the categories “Systems and equipment” and “Surfaces, passive fire protection and insulation.” We can see from the report that the figure for the category “Surfaces, passive fire protection and insulation” is lower than that indicated by our audits of some operators.

The data for mobile facilities show variations in the backlog in preventive maintenance and in outstanding corrective maintenance. A number of facilities have not carried out HSE-critical preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance in accordance with their own schedules.

6.3.1 THE MANAGEMENT OF MAINTENANCE OF FIXED FACILITIES

The main report shows more figures for maintenance management by participants than are reproduced here.




Figure 6-5 Total hours of maintenance, projects, modifications, and turnarounds for the fixed installations on the NCS during the period 2013 to 2025

Figure 6-5 shows that the total number of hours spent on these activities (maintenance, projects and modifications, and turnarounds) has increased since 2020. The number of hours spent on preventive maintenance has remained relatively stable since 2016, although we have seen a 10% increase over the past year. The number of hours spent on corrective maintenance is slightly lower in 2025 compared to previous years. The number of hours spent on modifications and projects has increased compared to previous years and is at its highest level since 2013. Over the past year, projects and modifications have increased by 28%. The number of turnaround hours decreased in 2025 compared to the previous three years, representing a reduction of nearly 45% compared to 2024.




Figure 6-6 Total PM backlog per year for the fixed installations on the NCS during the period 2015 to 2025

Figure 6-6 shows that the total backlog in preventive maintenance in 2025 is the highest reported since 2015, and amounts to nearly double the previous year. Of 77 facilities on the NCS that have reported hours, 40 facilities show an increase in backlog from 2024 to 2025. Two facilities have seen an increase of over 11,000 hours. The backlog in HSE-critical preventive maintenance fell somewhat in 2025 compared with recent years.




Figure 6-7 Total CM hours, identified but not yet completed, for the fixed installations on the NCS during the period 2015 to 2025

Figure 6-7 shows that there is overall a considerable number of hours of corrective maintenance not performed as at 31.12.2025. The volume in 2025 is, in reality, roughly the same as in 2024, even though the figure shows an increase in 2025. This increase is mainly due to the fact that one operator has reported figures for more failure modes than in previous years. Most operators have stable figures in 2025 compared to 2024.

6.3.2 THE MANAGEMENT OF MAINTENANCE OF MOBILE FACILITIES

Figure 6-8 provides an overview of tagged and classified equipment at 31.12.2025.




Figure 6-8 Tagged and classified equipment for the mobile offshore installations on the NCS, as of 31 Dec 2025

Figure 6-8 shows that there is large variation in the degree of tagging and classification of the facilities’ systems and equipment. In general, newer facilities have a higher quantity of tagged and classified equipment than the older ones. This is not apparent from the anonymised figure.

Figure 6-9 shows the backlog in preventive maintenance in 2025.




Figure 6-9 Total PM backlog for the mobile offshore installations on the NCS in 2025

Figure 6-9 shows variations in the outstanding corrective maintenance for mobile facilities. However, the hour count is relatively low for most facilities. Some facilities have not performed HSE-critical corrective maintenance in accordance with their defined schedules.

7. OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FATALITIES AND SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURIES

There were no fatalities within Havtil's area of authority on the NCS in 2025. For 2025, Havtil recorded 208 personal injuries on facilities in the petroleum activities on the NCS that fulfil the criteria of absence into the next shift or medical treatment. In 2024, a total of 205 personal injuries were reported. First-aid injuries and off-work injuries are not included in the statistics.

In recent years, we have seen a reduction in the number of injuries reported on the NAV (Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration) forms, and this trend continued in 2025. 60% of the injuries were not reported to Havtil on NAV forms in 2025. These injuries are therefore recorded on the basis of information received in connection with the quality assurance of the data. The injuries not reported on NAV forms include 12 classified as serious. The injuries concern both contractors' and operators' employees.

There were 163 personal injuries on production facilities in 2025, against 165 in 2024. In the long term, there has been a positive trend in the injury rate since 2014, when the overall rate was 7.1 injuries per million working hours. In 2025, there were 5.35 injuries per million working hours. This represents a fall from 2024 (when the injury rate was 5.67).

In 2025, there were 45 personal injuries on mobile facilities, compared to 40 in 2024. The total injury rate fell from 3.67 in 2024 to 3.54 injuries per million working hours in 2025. In 2021, we recorded the lowest level of injury in the entire period. In the long term, mobile facilities, like production facilities, have seen a positive trend. The injury rate has fallen from 6.7 in 2013 to 3.54 in 2025.

7.1 Serious personal injuries

Serious personal injuries are defined in the guidelines to the Management Regulations Section 31, which definition is used as the basis for classifying serious personal injuries.

Figure 7-1 shows the frequency of serious personal injuries on production facilities and mobile facilities combined. In 2025, a total of 23 serious personal injuries were reported, against 21 in 2024. In 2025, the injury rate is within the expected range based on the ten preceding years.




Figure 7-1 Serious personal injuries per million working hours – NCS

7.2 Serious personal injuries on production facilities

There were 16 serious personal injuries on production facilities in 2025. This is the same number as in 2024.

Figure 7-2 shows the frequency of serious personal injuries on production facilities per million working hours.




Figure 7-2 Serious personal injuries per million working hours – production facilities

7.3 Serious personal injuries on mobile facilities

Figure 7-3 shows the frequency of serious personal injuries per million working hours on mobile facilities. In 2025, the injury rate was 0.55 and we see a slight increase from 2024, although the level has remained fairly stable since 2020. The injury rate for 2025 is within the expected range.



Figure 7-3 Serious personal injuries per million working hours – mobile facilities

8. OTHER INDICATORS

8.1 DSHA 20 Crane and lifting operations

DSHA 20 crane and lifting operations includes incidents involving lifting equipment and its use which led to, or could have led to, personal injury or harm to equipment or the environment. It includes incidents both involving and not involving dropped objects. DSHA 20 was created and presented for the first time in the 2015 report. The time series now consists of data covering the period 2016-2025. The analysis looks at both the ten years combined and a comparison between the years, as appropriate.

The most important findings, which are also shown in the figures below, are:

Fixed facilities

- There was a marginal decline in the absolute number of reported incidents for fixed facilities in 2025 compared to 2024 (from 102 to 93). This also resulted in a reduced number of incidents normalised against the number of working hours, since there were fewer working hours in 2025 than in 2024 (Figure 8-1).
- For **incidents involving personal injury**, there was a decline from nine in 2024 to three in 2025, which is the lowest number since 2018. The number of incidents involving personal injury, normalised against working hours, also shows a clear fall. Given the relatively low number of personal injuries overall, the annual fluctuations in the normalised graph (Figure 8-2) will inevitably be relatively large.
- For incidents linked to **Lifting using offshore cranes**, there was a peak in 2022. Since 2022, there has been a decline that continues into 2025. Both the absolute number and the normalised number of incidents in 2025 are the lowest since 2016 (Figure 8-3).
- For **Lifting in the drilling module** the absolute number increased in 2023 to the maximum level of the entire analysis period (33, the same number of incidents as in 2017). In 2024, there was one more incident than in 2023, and in 2025 the upward trend continued with 37 incidents in the drilling module, making 2025 the year with the highest absolute number of incidents during the observation period. Both the number of incidents normalised against working hours and against drilled wells also increased from 2024 to 2025, reaching the highest level since 2017 for working hours and the highest level in the observation period for drilled wells (Figure 8-4 and Figure 8-5).
- Looking at events (excluding personal injury) with **potential for injury** (i.e., involving exposed individuals), the total number remains stable throughout the observation period (between 11 and 16 incidents per year), with the exception of 2019 (25 incidents) and 2022 (28 incidents). In 2025, there were 11 such incidents, which is the lowest number in the observation period. However, the distribution of the number of people exposed varies considerably from year to year (Figure 8-6).

Mobile facilities

- The normalisation data for mobile facilities show a noteworthy trend from 2024 to 2025 (see also Table 8.1): The number of wells drilled increased by 63 percent from 2024 to 2025, while the number of working hours for drilling and well operations increased by only 9.4 percent. This implies a reduction in working hours for drilling and well operations from 0.044 million working hours per drilled well in 2024 to 0.030 million working hours per drilled well in 2025, which is a 33 percent reduction.
- For mobile facilities, there has been a downward trend since 2020 in terms of both the absolute number of incidents and incidents normalised against the number of working hours. This trend reversed in 2025, when there was a marked increase both in the number of incidents (from 47 to 77 incidents) and in the rate normalised against the number of working hours (from 5.7 to 7.4 incidents per million working hours) (Figure 8-1).
- For **incidents involving personal injury**, there was an increase from 2024 to 2025, and the number of injuries (seven) is the highest in the entire observation period. Normalised against the number of working hours, 2025 saw the highest figure of the entire observation period. Given the relatively low number of incidents involving personal injuries, the annual fluctuations will however inevitably be relatively high. Seven injuries in 2025 is about five more than the average for the period 2016–2024 (Figure 8-2).
- For incidents related to **Lifting using offshore cranes**, a marked increase in the number of incidents was recorded in 2025 compared to 2024 (from six in 2024 to 21 in 2025), and for the first time since 2016, the normalised line for mobile facilities crosses above the corresponding line for fixed facilities (Figure 8-3).
- For **Lifting in the drilling module**, a marked increase in the absolute number of incidents was recorded in 2025 (from 37 in 2024 to 50 in 2025), and similarly when normalised against working hours (from 6.56 incidents per million working hours in 2024 to 8.10 incidents per million working hours in 2025). In 2025, both the absolute figure and the figure normalised against working hours attained their highest levels in the entire observation period. (Figure 8-4). However, if one looks at the number of incidents related to lifting in the drilling module, normalised against the number of wells drilled, there was a decrease in 2025 compared to 2024 (from 0.29 incidents per well drilled in 2024 to 0.24 incidents per well drilled in 2025), and is now at its lowest level since 2019 (Figure 8-5). The reason why the number of incidents normalised against the number of wells drilled shows a decline, while the number of incidents normalised against the number of working hours (and the absolute number of incidents) is increasing, is the sharp rise in the number of wells drilled in 2025 (a 63 percent increase from 2024 to 2025), while the number of working hours related to drilling and well operations saw a much smaller increase (up only 9.4 percent from 2024 to 2025).

- Looking at incidents without personal injury, but with the **potential for injury**, in 2025 there were three incidents with one or more persons exposed, which is approximately the average for recent years (Figure 8-7).

Table 8.1 Overview of working hours related to drilling and well operations and the number of exploration and production wells drilled for fixed and mobile facilities during the period 2016–2025

Fixed	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Millions of working hours - Drilling and well operations	4.61	4.77	4.97	5.05	5.02	5.56	5.00	5.55	5.47	5.66
Millions of working hours – Construction and maintenance	10.95	9.81	11.34	12.47	9.84	10.82	12.80	13.04	12.58	13.71
Drilled production wells (number)	71	63	59	64	57	54	50	68	49	49
Exploration wells drilled (number)	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	3
Drilled production wells + exploration wells (number)	71	64	59	65	57	54	51	69	51	52
Mobile	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Millions of working hours - Drilling and well operations	3.30	3.00	4.36	4.44	6.26	6.75	6.15	5.60	5.64	6.17
Millions of working hours – Construction and maintenance	3.95	3.15	3.51	3.15	4.10	4.73	4.04	3.28	3.22	4.20
Drilled production wells (number)	105	114	121	132	123	132	96	102	84	159
Exploration wells drilled (number)	36	35	53	57	31	40	33	33	43	48
Drilled production wells + exploration wells (number)	141	149	174	189	154	172	129	135	127	207




Figure 8-1 Number of reported incidents for crane and lifting operations in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile facilities – absolute numbers and numbers normalised against millions of working hours related to drilling and well operations and to construction and maintenance




Figure 8-2 Number of incidents with personnel injury for crane and lifting operations in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile facilities - absolute numbers and numbers normalised against millions of working hours related to drilling and well operations and to construction and maintenance




Figure 8-3 Number of reported incidents related to offshore crane lifting operations in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile facilities – absolute numbers and numbers normalised against millions of working hours related to drilling and well operations, and to construction and maintenance



Figure 8-4 Number of incidents related to lifting in drilling module in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile facilities – absolute numbers and numbers normalised against millions of working hours related to (only) drilling and well operations




Figure 8-5 Number of incidents related to lifting in drilling module in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile installations – absolute numbers and numbers normalised against number of wells drilled (search and production)




Figure 8-6 Number of incidents without personnel injury with people exposed to the incident, for fixed installations for the period 2016 to 2025




Figure 8-7 Number of incidents *without* personnel injury with people exposed to the incident, for mobile installations for the period 2016 to 2025

8.2 DSHA 21 Dropped objects

DSHA 21 Dropped objects comprises all incidents where an object falls within a facility’s safety zone, either on deck or into the sea, with the potential for becoming an accident, and which does not involve crane and lifting equipment and the use thereof. Incidents linked to cranes and lifting equipment and the use thereof are presented in DSHA 20.

With effect from the 2015 report, a new DSHA 20, Crane and lifting operations, was introduced for offshore facilities, which entailed changes to DSHA 21 Dropped objects. Up until the 2022 report, the entire period back to 2015 was presented. New in 2023 was a switch to presenting data for the past ten years. This year’s report presents data covering the period 2016-2025. The analysis looks at both the ten years combined and a comparison between the years, as appropriate.

The most important findings, which are also shown in the figures below, are:

Fixed facilities

- The absolute **number of reported incidents** for *fixed facilities* in 2025 is at roughly the same level as in 2024. When normalised against the number of working hours, there is a decline in 2025, continuing a slight downward trend since 2019 (Figure 8-8).
- **Number of incidents involving personal injury** rose strongly in 2023, before falling sharply in 2024. In 2025, the number of incidents involving personal injury is roughly the same as it was before 2023, during the period 2020–2022 (Figure 8-9).

- **The number of dropped objects with energy >40 J** in 2025 was the highest in the entire observation period (Figure 8-10).
- **Number of dropped objects with energy >40 J** related to **Scaffolding** shows a sharp increase in 2025, with the highest number in the entire observation period at 61. This represents a doubling of the number of incidents compared to the previous year (Figure 8-10). This is also reflected in the absolute number of DSHA 21 incidents of >40 J on fixed installations related to the erection/dismantling and use of scaffolding in 2025, which is the highest figure in the observation period. Normalised against working hours for construction and maintenance, 2025 is the highest since 2019 (Figure 8-11).
- For incidents on *fixed installations* **without injuries, but with exposed personnel** (one, two or more people), the number of incidents involving one exposed person has decreased further from 2024 to 2025 and is at its lowest level since 2018. The number of incidents involving two exposed persons in 2025 was roughly the same as in the four preceding years. The number of incidents involving more than two exposed persons in 2025 was three, which is among the lowest in the observation period (Figure 8-12).

Mobile facilities

- **The normalisation data** for *mobile facilities* show a noteworthy trend from 2024 to 2025: The number of wells drilled increased by 63 percent from 2024 to 2025, while the number of working hours for drilling and well operations increased by only 9.4 percent. This implies a reduction in working hours for drilling and well operations from 0.044 million working hours per drilled well in 2024 to 0.030 million working hours per drilled well in 2025, which is a 33 percent reduction (Table 8.1).
- For *mobile facilities*, there was a small increase from 2024 to 2025 in both the **absolute number of incidents** and the **number of incidents normalised** against working hours. The number of incidents has been declining throughout the period from 2020 to 2024 (in absolute terms) and from 2018 to 2024, with the exception of 2022 (in normalised terms). This trend was broken in 2025, with an increase in both the absolute and normalised number of incidents. (Figure 8-8).
- There were four incidents reported **involving personal injury** in 2025 on *mobile facilities*, which is the highest number recorded during the entire observation period. All four injuries were of low severity (Figure 8-9).
- The number of **dropped objects with energy <40 J** in **Drilling areas** continues a marked downward trend in 2025, from 30 in 2019 to three in 2025 (Figure 8-13). For dropped objects with **energy >40 J** there was an increase in 2025 compared to 2024, but the figure remains roughly at the same level as in 2020–2023 (Figure 8-14).




Figure 8-8 Number of reported incidents with dropped objects in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile installations – absolute numbers and numbers normalised against millions of working hours related to drilling and well operations and to construction and maintenance




Figure 8-9 Number of incidents with personnel injury due to dropped objects in the period 2016-2025 for fixed and mobile installations - absolute numbers and numbers normalised against millions of working hours related to drilling and well operations, and to construction and maintenance




Figure 8-10 Total number of dropped objects on fixed installations with energy > 40 J, distributed among main areas for the period 2016-2025




Figure 8-11 Number of reported incidents with dropped objects on fixed installations and use of scaffolding, <40 J to the left, and >40 J to the right, normalised against working hours connected to construction and maintenance, in the period 2016-2025




Figure 8-12 Number of reported incidents with dropped objects with personnel exposed, without personnel injury, for fixed installations in the period 2016 to 2025




Figure 8-13 Total number of dropped objects on mobile installations with energy < 40 J, distributed among main areas in the period 2016-2025




Figure 8-14 Total number of dropped objects on mobile installations with energy > 40 J, distributed among main areas in the period 2016-2025

8.3 Other DSHAs

The main report presents data for incidents that have been reported to Havtil, as well as for other DSHAs without major accident potential, such as DSHA 11, 13, 16 and 19.

9. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

9.1 Definitions

See sub-chapters 1.10.1 - 1.10.3, as well as 5.2, in the main report.

9.2 Abbreviations

For a detailed list of abbreviations, see Havtil, 2026a. The most important abbreviations in this report are:

CODAM	Database for damage to structures and subsea facilities (now the Incident database)
BDV	Blowdown valve
BOP	Blowout Preventer
BORA	Barrier and operational risk analysis
DDRS/CDRS	Database for drilling and well operations
DSHA	Defined situations of hazard and accident
DHSV	Downhole safety valve

DSYS	Havtil's database of personal injuries and hours of exposure during diving activities
ESDV	Emergency shutdown valve
PM	Preventive maintenance
GM	Metacentre height of floating facilities
HSE	Health, Safety and the Environment
KG	The distance from the keel to the centre of gravity on floating facilities
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
CM	Corrective maintenance
Havtil	The Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority (formerly the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway)
RNNP	Trends in risk level in the Norwegian petroleum activity
WIF	Well Integrity Forum

10. REFERENCES

Detailed reference lists can be found in the main reports:

Havtil, 2026a. Risk level in the petroleum activity – Norwegian Continental Shelf, Main report, 25.03.2026

Havtil, 2026b. Risk level in the petroleum activity – onshore installations, 25.03.2026

Havtil, 2026c. Risk level in the petroleum activity – Methodology report, 25.03.2026